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Abstract
In this paper we use a longitudinal survey of Russian households for analyzing the impact
of wage arrears on the incidence of poverty among families and their survival strategies. The
failure of enterprises and government to fully pay workers in a timely fashion is shown to be
associated with a higher incidence of poverty; a similar effect is found for pensioners
experiencing pension arrears. As a result of pay delays, we find that individuals and families
were more likely to take second jobs, increase home production for own-consumption and sale,
reduce their rate of saving, sell family assets, and receive transfers of goods and money from
relatives (which, in turn, reduce the effect of wage nonpayment on poverty). Wage nonpayment
also contributed to a rise in barter between workers and firms, although the monetary value of
these goods and services did little to arrest the upward trend in outstanding net debt to workers.
/. Introduction
Throughout the course of the transition, Russian enterprises and federal as well as regional
governments have repeatedly failed to fully pay large segments of their employees.1 The wage
nonpayment problem worsened over time, by 1996 leading to a sustained public outcry and increased
union militancy.2 The upward trend in arrears is seen in the table below which focuses on the three
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to the monthlv wage bill (percent)
1992 5 6 6
1993 13 10 36
1994 31 23 68
1995 61 40 102
1 9 9 6 l U 7 4
SOURCE: Russian Economic Trends, 1997.1
1While public perception has focused on government wage nonpayment, only about 20 percent of
outstanding arrears are owed to government employees, the remaining wage debt being owed to workers in
privatized enterprises.
2Strikes by hard hit groups, among them coal miners, teachers, and nuclear power workers
increased substantially by 1996. Union militancy on this issue has attempted to bring the plight of Russian
workers to the attention of the international community through the establishment of a cybercampaign
focused on the nonpayments crisis (this site may be reached at
www.icem.org/campaigns/no_pay_cc/index.html).
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since the beginning of the transition.3 The constant dollar value of outstanding wage arrears
consistently increased between 1992 and 1996; by approximately 17-fold in industry, 10-fold in
construction, and 12-fold in agriculture. As a percentage of the sector's monthly wage bill, the
increase was approximately 22-fold in industry, 12-fold in construction, and 26-fold in agriculture.
Although the wage arrears crisis has received much public attention, there is a paucity of
research addressing the impact of wage nonpayment on Russian workers and the ways in which
individuals and families have responded to pay delays. In this paper, we employ longitudinal data
relating to Russian households for analyzing these questions. Specifically, we look at the effect of
arrears on the incidence of family poverty4; supplemental economic activity such as multiple job
holding and less formal, paid economic activity; home production for consumption and sale; various
forms of dissavings such as taking out loans, withdrawing savings, and selling family assets; and
increased intra-family transfers from relatives to people experiencing nonpayment. We also consider
the role of home production and income transfers from relatives in mitigating the impact of wage
arrears on poverty; and barter arrangements between enterprises and workers.
//. Wage Arrears, Pension Arrears, and Poverty
Our assessment of the impact of wage arrears on the Russian people utilizes the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, a longitudinal data set of Russian households and individuals.5 We
focus on the years 1994-96 for which data on wage arrears are available. These questions were asked
of all respondents who indicated that they were either at work or on unpaid or paid leave. Our
analysis focuses on the subset of people aged 17-64 who were receiving positive wages from their
Comparison of total wage arrears in 1996 to earlier years is problematic because sectors for which
wage arrears are reported are not comparable: only medium and large-sized enterprises in industry,
construction, and agriculture reported data on wage arrears from 1992-94; the transportation sector was
added in 1995; in 1996, four noncommercial sectors were added ~ health care, education, culture, and
science.
4Wage nonpayment not only reduces family disposable income directly but also cuts into family
wealth because wage arrears are not indexed. This means that even if Russian workers were to be
eventually repaid, they would have suffered a significant loss given the high monthly inflation rates that
persisted through 1995 (and, while having fallen in 1996, were still as high as 20 percent at the end of the
year).
information on the structure of the survey, the questionnaires, and data sources may be obtained
over the internet at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms.
primary jobs at the time of the interviews.
Table 1 investigates the relationship between wage arrears and the incidence of poverty.6
Three conclusions follow from the analysis. Poverty, measured in terms of the percentage of people
who were in families with incomes below regional poverty thresholds, had increased in Russia during
the transition irrespective of whether people were owed wages.7 When we compare the two rows in
panel (A), we see that (i) the percentage in poverty was higher in all years for people who were owed
wages and (ii) the incidence of poverty had increased more rapidly between 1994 and 1996 for people
who were owed wages.
The multivariate analysis reported in panel (B) shows that this impact of wage arrears on
poverty, captured by the indicator variable Pjowed* remains highly significant even after we control
for demographic and job market attributes of the respondents. Again, the effect of wage arrears on
the likelihood of a family being in poverty increased between 1994 and 1996 as reflected by the
significant and positive interaction effects; wage nonpayment increased the likelihood of a respondent
being in poverty by 8.9 percent in 1994 (once again, relative to people who did not have some portion
of their wages withheld), by 12.3 percent in 1995, and by 13.6 percent in 1996.9
We extend our analysis of the impact of payment arrears on poverty by investigating the
impact of pension arrears in Table 2. Nonpayment of pensions, or pension arrears, has progressed
6Our indicator variable which defines the regional poverty thresholds is Pov_index, a dummy=l if
family income (adjusted for the structure of the family, i.e. number and age of children, number and gender
of adults, number of elderly) falls below the poverty threshold, and 0 if family income does not fall below
the poverty threshold. The threshold is calculated on the basis of a subsistence minimum consumption
bundle, using subsistence food amounts for approximately 55 food items for five demographic groups
(young children, older children, adult males, adult females and the elderly), and regional average prices for
each item (that are calculated for ten regions).
7See Popkin and Mroz (1995), Mikhalev (1996), Milanovic (1996), Gregory (1997) and Klugman
(1997) for discussions of trends in Russian poverty and issues relating to its measurement.
8The variable Pjowed is based on the survey question, "At the present time, does your place of
work owe you any money, which for various reasons was not paid on time?" The response is coded as 1 if
the respondent said "yes" and as 0 if the respondent said "no". The value of this variable increased from
approximately 26 percent in 1994 to approximately 40 percent in 1996.
9These values are based on transformations of the reported coefficients of the interaction terms in
specification (2) into slopes evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables.
during the transition hand-in-hand with wage arrears.10 Respondents were first asked if they currently
received a pension, and, if they responded affirmatively, they were next asked if they "receive(d) a
pension in the last 30 days". We use this latter question to quantify the incidence of pension arrears.
Although pensions were occasionally received by people who were still working, we focus our
analysis on pension recipients who indicated that they had retired.11
Considering first the incidence of pension arrears, we see in column (1) in panel (B) that
pension arrears, net of the effects of the control variables, increased significantly over the period: the
estimated year effects rise from 0.566 in 1995 to 1.585 in 1996 in a regression with a dummy
dependent variable (Pens30) that equals one if the respondents failed to receive their pensions in the
past 30 days.12 We next assess the impact of pension arrears on pushing people into poverty. In panel
(A) we report simple mean comparisons of poverty incidence in terms of whether or not people were
experiencing pension arrears. We notice that the poverty rates were significantly higher for people
facing pension arrears in all years: in 1996, 69.5 percent of the people in our sample who were
experiencing pension arrears were poor, while only 10.5 percent of the sample who were not
experiencing pension arrears were poor. The last two columns of Panel (B) extend this inquiry by
investigating the net effect of pension arrears on the likelihood that a person will experience poverty.
The significantly positive coefficient of our indicator variable for the presence of pension nonpayment
in column (2), 1.639, indicates that pension arrears per se increased the likelihood of poverty.
Furthermore, we see from the increasingly positive coefficients of the interaction terms in column 3
that incurring pension arrears had a stronger (positive) effect on the likelihood of pensioners falling
into poverty over the 1994-96 period, i.e. the estimated effect rises from 1.332 in 1994 to 1.459 in
10On July 1, 1997, as promised, the Yeltsin government repaid all outstanding pension debts.
Although this element of the nonpayment crisis was temporarily resolved, the lack of structural reforms
and improvement in tax collection for the Pension Fund has caused renewed accumulation of pension
arrears.
uData from the RLMS indicate that 12.1 percent of respondents who indicated that they were
employed at the time of the survey, also received a pension; similarly, 10.2 percent of the people who
indicated that they were not retired responded that they were receiving a pension. These results are
averaged over the 1994-96 period.
12The coefficients of the control variables (not presented in the Table) reveal that (i) there was no
difference in arrears incidence for women, (ii) arrears decreased with age, (iii) arrears were lower for the
most educated, and (iv) all regions had lower pension arrears than in Moscow and St. Petersburg, with
substantial variation in arrears across regions as evidenced by the large variation in the regional
coefficients. (The full results are available on request.)
1995 and again to 1.756 in 1996. Although we do not have evidence on the magnitude of pension
arrears, this effect implies that the ruble value of outstanding pension arrears increased over time.
///. Family and Individual Responses to Wage Arrears
How do families get by when they are not paid? Presenting below a number of survival
mechanisms at play in Russia in response to wage arrears, we examine their impact in moderating
the incidence of poverty among households.
Secondary Job Holding and Informal Paid Work
People tended to respond to wage nonpayment by taking secondary jobs and engaging in
informal, supplemental work for pay.13 Traditional models of moonlighting behavior argue that
workers take second jobs when they are underemployed on their main job, which is defined as
workers desiring more work hours than their main employer makes available to them, i.e. the wage
rate on their main job is greater than their marginal rate of substitution between earnings
(consumption) and leisure at current hours of work (see Shisko and Rostker, 1976). This framework
assumes that workers are paid for hours of work, i.e. they are underemployed if they want to earn
more income by working more (paid) hours. Nonpayment of wages may be seen in a similar light:
workers, unable to generate their desired income on their primary jobs,14 engage in supplemental
employment in order to meet their income goals. From that perspective, the wage arrears crisis can
have real effects on the economy, in addition to those generated by changes in expenditure due to
changes in disposable income, by inducing labor supply responses in the form of supplemental
economic activity.15
We consider two forms of secondary economic activity. The variable Adpdjb is a dummy that
13See Foley (1997) for a study of patterns in multiple job holding in Russia during the transition.
14Depending on management behavior, it might be more accurate to model the labor supply effects
of wage arrears as a cut in wage rates (in the case where management tends to withhold pay based on a
percentage of earnings) or a limitation on available paid hours (in the case where management tends to
cease payments after a certain threshold level of earnings is reached).
15Wage arrears may also produce labor supply effects in primary employment, i.e. increase quits
from enterprises and sectors that fail to fully pay their wage obligations. The Soviet-era linkage of social
services and housing to the employing enterprise limits these mobility responses.
indicates whether or not a person holds a second job for pay in formal secondary employment.16 By
contrast, the variable Engiea is a dummy that indicates whether or not the respondent does additional
work for pay although the actual survey question clearly addresses less formal types of work, largely
self-employment activities.17 In the RLMS sampling procedure, the former question was only asked
of people who reported that they currently held a job whereas the latter was asked of all respondents.
However, our sample restrictions ensure that in both cases we are considering the same group of
people.18 As noted above, we have restricted our sample to people who indicated that they held a job
(the wage arrears questions were only asked of these people), and we further impose the sample
restriction of positive wage payments thereby deleting from the sample people who held jobs but were
currently on voluntary or involuntary leave.
The simple univariate patterns in panels (A) and (B) of Table 3 suggest that people who were
owed wages were more likely to hold second jobs (Adpdjb) in 1995 and 1996, and were more likely
to engage in supplemental individual economic activity (Engiea) in all years. For example, in 1996
5.9 percent of the people who were owed wages held second jobs, while only 4.1 percent of our
sample who were not owed wages held second jobs; similarly, 7.9 percent of respondents who were
owed wages engaged in informal work for pay, while 4.8 percent of those not owed wages did so. In
panel (C), the significantly positive coefficients of Pjowed (0.147 for the Adpdjb regression and 0.232
for the Engiea regression) indicate that this relationship remains robust when we include other
covariates, providing compelling evidence that wage nonpayment had distinct labor supply effects
with respect to multiple job holding and less formal supplemental work. While wage arrears allowed
enterprise managers to retain redundant workers by providing downward wage flexibility (see Desai
16The variable Adpdjb is based on the survey question, "Tell me, please, do you have some other
kind of work?" The response is coded as 1 if the answer is "yes" and as 0 if the answer is "no."
17The variable Engiea is based on the survey question, "Tell me, please, in the last 30 days did you
engage in some additional kind of work for which you got paid? Maybe you sewed someone a dress, gave
someone a ride in a car, assisted someone with apartment or car repairs, purchased and delivered food,
looked after a sick person, or did something else that you were paid for?" The response is coded as 1 if the
answer is "yes" and as 0 if the answer is "no".
18These sample restrictions may bias our estimates of supplemental work activity and the effects of
arrears on supplemental labor supply decisions because people on leave will tend to have different
incentives for engaging in supplemental work from those currently receiving wages. The direction of the
bias is also not obvious because those on voluntary leave, including maternity leave, might have relatively
high reservation wages during their leave and might be less likely to find alternative work while those on
involuntary leave might be in greater need of supplemental income.
and Idson, 1998), they also acted to stimulate employment (measured by total hours worked) and
output through these induced labor supply effects.19
Intra-Family Transfers
Do people who suffer from wage nonpayment receive help from relatives?20 The following
excerpt from an ICFTU (International Conference of Free Trade Unions) newsletter on the wage
arrears crisis illustrates the situation:
"How do people manage to survive for months without receiving any wages?, is
the question regularly asked by visitors from the West. So we asked Larisa
Seliverstova, the chairperson of the trade union committee of school number 10
in Prokop'evsk, Kemerovo oblast, about the budget of her own family. 'How do
you survive? Does someone help you?' 'Our parents help: my husband has two
and I have one. My father gives us all of his pension - he is still working. My
husband's mother helps us with food. Grandpa and grandma completely support
our child. They live in a private house which has a garden, and they also have an
allotment.'" (ICFTU Campaign on the Non-payment of Wages in Russia,
Newsletter No. 2, September 1997).
In this section we analyze the income supplements received by workers with wage arrears from
family members, i.e. from parents giving money to working (adult) children, adults giving money to
working parents, and relatives, among them aunts, uncles and grandparents providing support to
cash-strapped relatives.21 We also analyze if wage nonpayment results in people giving less material
help to family members.22
19We also find, in results not reported here, that women were less likely than men to engage in
supplemental work activities perhaps due to family obligations. When we split the sample by gender, we
again find that wage arrears had a significant and positive effect on supplemental labor supply for men, but
an insignificant (though positive) effect for women possibly reflecting family constraints and/or gender
differences in secondary job market opportunities. (These results are available on request.)
20Cox, et al. (1997) found that intra-family transfers were pervasive in Russia during the years
1992 and 1993 and served to reduce poverty.
21The survey question is: "Has your family received money, food, clothes, or other goods in the
last 30 days and, if so, how would you assess this aid in rubles?" Sources of aid from either spouse's
parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, and/or other relatives are counted as intra-family
transfers.
22Our measure is based on the survey question: "Has your family or one of its members given or
sent money or goods - food, clothes, other items - without obligation to people who are not members of
your household - children, parents, other relatives, friends, or simply strangers - in the last 30 days?"
Transfers to either spouse's parents, children, grandparents, or grandchildren are included in the
measure.
The simple averages listed in panel (A) of Table 4 indicate that in all three years from 1994
to 1996, the likelihood of receiving a transfer (rows 3) was higher for people who faced arrears,
although, conditional on receipt of a transfer, the amount received (rows 4) was no higher for those
facing arrears than for those not facing arrears. Respondents who were experiencing wage
nonpayment were less likely to give money (and/or goods) to relatives in 1995, although in 1994 and
1996 wage arrears did not seem to influence transfers to relatives (rows 1). Among people who did
give money (and/or goods) to relatives, the amount given (rows 2) was lower in 1995 and 1996 when
the donor was suffering from arrears. In Panel (B) we see from the estimated coefficients of Pjowed
that these patterns persist even after we control for demographic attributes and other variables. The
negative coefficients of Pjowed in the first and second regressions, -0.067 and -97870.98
respectively, suggest that wage nonpayment was associated with a decrease in the material help
given to relatives. The positive coefficient of Pjowed in the third regression (0.143) suggests that
people who were not receiving their full pay were more likely to receive material help from relative,
although the insignificant coefficient of Pjowed in the third regression (-9243.58) indicates that the
amounts given were not related to the presence of wage debt.23
Home Production for Consumption and/or Sale
Families may also engage in own-production of goods for consumption and/or for sale in
order to maintain their standard of living. Simple averages of home produced food24, reported in
Panel (A) of Table 5a, reveal that home production of harvested food for self consumption was
greater among people who were owed wages (rows 1). We also notice (rows 2) that people who
were owed wages were more likely to produce agricultural products for sale,25 and the average value
of these goods, conditional on any production being undertaken (rows 3), was higher for individuals
who were owed wages. It is possible, though, that these univariate patterns might simply reflect
23We also found that these relationships between arrears and transfers were constant during
1994-96, with the exception that in 1996 the ruble value of transfers to family members, conditional on a
transfer taking place, was significantly lower among donors who suffered from wage arrears than was the
case in 1994 (the results are available on request).
24These goods include any of 25 different foods that may have been grown/harvested on land that
the family either owns or leases (a detailed list of food items is available on request).
25These goods include items referred to in footnote 23, plus sales of livestock, poultry,
bees/honey, wool/down, milk, eggs, hides, mushrooms, nuts, berries and fish.
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higher levels of wage arrears in regions where the use of private plots of land for agricultural
purposes was more widespread. However, when we introduce control variables into the analysis, in
Panel (B), the relationship between arrears and own-production persist, suggesting that the impact of
wage arrears on home production documented in Panel (A) is not simply reflecting the influence of
secondary relationships such as the location of the household that are associated with the incidence
of wage arrears.
Household Savings and Dissavings
Families may also maintain consumption patterns by varying their rate of savings and by
engaging in various forms of dissaving including borrowing (loans), selling family consumer
durables and other assets, and drawing down accumulated savings. We analyze family dissaving in
Table 5b followed by changes in savings rates in Table 5c. Table 5b reports evidence that people
who were owed wages were more likely (than people who had been fully paid) to sell some of their
family assets (rows I)26 and to take out loans (rows 2), although conditional on taking out a loan,
people facing wage delays tended to borrow smaller amounts (rows 3), a result most likely due
simply to difficulties in qualifying for larger loans. Panel (B) reveals that these wage arrears effects
persist when control variables are introduced: the positive estimated effects of Pjowed on the
tendency of respondents to sell family assets (0.206) and to take out loans (0.338) suggest these
survival mechanisms are a genuine response to the arrears crisis, rather than reflecting the
association of the incidence of nonpayment with regions or industries (for example) where the
tradition or opportunity for home-production is most pronounced.
Do people tend to save less and in smaller amounts, and to withdraw money from their
savings when faced with wage nonpayment? The simple mean comparisons in Panel (A) of Table
5c indicate that people facing wage nonpayment were less likely to save money, e.g. in 1996 only
6.5 percent of the respondents who experienced wage arrears saved any money, while 9.6 percent of
those people not experiencing wage arrears had positive savings rates. In Panel (B) the significantly
negative estimated effect of Pjowed (-0.137) indicates that this result persist even when controls for
26Respondents were asked if they owned any of the items in a list of seven different consumer
durables, plus cars, boats, apartments and houses, and then asked, "In the last 3 months has your family
sold any of their things in order to get enough money for food and clothing?"
respondent attributes and family location are taken into account. However, the insignificant mean
comparisons in last three rows of Panel (A), in addition to the insignificant effect of Pjowed in the
last three regressions in Panel (B), suggest that the other potential survival mechanisms were not
important in Russia during the 1994-96 period: i.e., although people experiencing wage arrears were
less likely to save (conditional on positive savings), people who were owed wages had average
savings levels similar to those for people who were fully paid, and people did not seem to
compensate for wage arrears by living off their savings. It may well be that savings were generally so
low that few people could meaningfully make use of this last adjustment mechanism.
Wage Arrears and Poverty: The Effect of Intra-Family Transfers and Home-Production
We have seen above that wage arrears were positively associated with the incidence of
poverty, that they increased transfers from relatives, and raised home production. Do these higher
levels of intra-family transfers and home-production mitigate the effect of wage arrears on the
incidence of family poverty? For addressing this question, we create three poverty indicators, each
defining poverty status by the usual condition of incomes falling below specified (regional) income
thresholds, or poverty lines. The first uses actual family income27 {Povl)\ the second supplements
this income measure by the monetary value of intra-family transfers (Pov2); the third supplements
actual family income by the monetary value of home production (Pov3). Next we define two
variables, Compl is a dummy equal to 1 when a person is classified as poor based on index Povl but
is not classified as poor using index Pov2, and equal to zero when Povl and Pov2 yield the same
poverty classification. The variable Compl thus signals if the monetary value of intra-family
transfers raised total family income (including transfers) above the regional poverty threshold, that is,
if the value of intra-family transfers were insufficient to move the individual out of poverty. The
variable Comp2 is similarly a dummy, equal to 1 if a person is classified as poor using index Povl
but is not classified as poor using index Pov3, i.e. it indicates if the monetary value of home
production raises total family income (including home production) above the regional poverty
threshold. Given our earlier finding that people who experienced wage arrears were more likely to
27We use the responses to the survey question, "How much did your family receive (from a
primary or additional place of work) after taxes and other deductions in the last 30 days? If you were
paid in the form of goods or services, what was the approximate value in rubles?"
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receive transfers from relatives and engage in home production, we expect that the inclusion of the
value of these supplemental forms of income will more likely move people out of poverty when they
are experiencing wage arrears than when they are being fully paid.28
The results from this analysis are reported in Table 6. Panel (A) provides simple
comparisons of mean values for the variables Compl and Comp2. In 1994 and 1996, the values of
Compl are smaller in row 1 than in row 2 suggesting that intra-family transfers had a greater effect on
moving people out of poverty for people experiencing wage arrears than for people who were fully
paid. In 1996, for example, 5.19 percent of the people in our sample who were experiencing pay
delays are classified as poor based on the poverty index that uses family income (Povl), but are not
classified as poor if intra-family transfers are included in family income (Pov2): in other words, intra-
family transfers move 5.19 percent of the poor who suffer wage arrears out of poverty. By contrast,
among people not experiencing pay delays, intra-family transfers move only 3.85 percent out of
poverty. We observe similar patterns for home production, i.e. the inclusion of home production acts
to move a higher percentage of people out of poverty when they experienced wage arrears (3.15
percent in 1996) than when they were fully paid (1.31 percent in 1996).29 The last two columns in
Panel (B) provide the multivariate counterpart to the results in panel (A). The positive coefficients
of Pjowed indicate that both intra-family transfers and home production are more likely to alleviate
poverty for people experiencing wage arrears than for those who are fully paid.
As a complement to the above test, we also estimate the effect of wage nonpayment on the
likelihood of poverty for each of our three poverty indicators, shown in the first three columns of
Panel (B). Our expectation is that Pjowed will be a weaker (positive) predictor of poverty incidence
when intra-family transfers (Pov2), or home production (Pov3), are included than when they are not
taken into account (Povl). Comparing the coefficients of Pjowed in the first column in panel (B)
28Given that wage arrears increase the likelihood of poverty, transfers might reduce the
likelihood of wage arrears sufferers falling below poverty thresholds, while at the same time insufficient
to move them above the given thresholds. An investigation of the effects of arrears per se, and of the
alleviating effects of intra-family transfers, on the position of people in the income distribution of those
in poverty remains for future work.
29We should emphasize that our results in Tables 4, 5a, 5b, and 5c document a positive
relationship between arrears and both intra-family transfers and home production, while the patterns
reported in Table 6 show that these family responses to wage arrears significantly influenced the likelihood
of their experiencing poverty.
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with those in the second and third columns, we find that wage arrears had a weaker effect on the
likelihood of families being in poverty when intra-family transfers (column 2), or home production
(column 3), are included as part of family income.
Wage Arrears and Barter
Along with escalating wage arrears, barter arrangements between enterprises and their
employees, and among enterprises as payments for their output, increased between 1994 and 1996
(see Yakovlev, 1998; Aukutsionek, 1998).30 Countless examples of barter arrangements as
alternatives to monetary payments have been noted in the press. To quote from an article from the
BBC Online Network (August 24, 1998): "One factory in the City of Perm regularly pays its
workforce in bicycles - which they then have to try and sell on the streets in direct competition with
their employers." A more extreme occurrence was reported in the Chicago Tribune (October 12,
1997): "Russian seamstresses owed two years of back wages refused to accept coffins as barter
payments, asking for grocery carts instead, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. The workers at the
Voskhod clothing plant in Yaya, about 1,900 miles east of Moscow, would use the carts ~ worth
about $21 each — to transport vegetables from their land plots. 'They are refusing to take the coffins
in advance, explaining that they want to live and not to die,' the news agency said." Forms of near
money that provide liquidity, facilitate transactions and contribute to price flexibility have also
appeared (see Woodruff, 1996). Liquidity constraints have evidently contributed to wage arrears and
barter of goods for labor services in Russia, in addition to the continually present incentives of lower
tax liabilities associated with barter rather than monetary transactions.31
Wage nonpayment is clearly associated with enterprises providing partial payment to workers
in the form of goods. We see in panel (A) of Table 7 that, among workers who were owed wages, 13
30The shortage of cash to pay wages is exacerbated by enterprise attempts to reduce the amount of
cash flowing into company accounts as a way of avoiding cash tax payments. A large percentage of tax
liabilities are instead paid through tax writeoffs accomplished with barter transactions between enterprises
and the government. The extensive incentives for nonmonetary exchange in Russia has led to what some
writers have called a demonetization of the Russian Economy (see Hendley, et al., 1998).
31Pendergast and Stole (1996) provide arguments for barter within organizations that are not based
on liquidity constraints per se. Among these are the ability of enterprises to reduce excess inventories
creating negotiations between enterprises and workers for mutually beneficial barter arrangements (see
Roha and Schulhof, 1996) and use of goods as a source of price flexibility (see Stigler, 1969).
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percent received a portion of their compensation in the form of goods (Goodspf1 in 1994, the fraction
dropping to 9 percent in 1995 and rising to 15 percent in 1996. Since these percentages are calculated
from the base of people who were owed wages, which rose from 26 percent in 1994 to 40 percent in
1996, the growth in the prevalence of barter arrangements between 1994 and 1996 was greater than
the 11 percent increase suggested by the comparison in Panel (A) between 13 percent in 1994 and 15
percent in 1996. Adjusting these latter estimates by wage arrears incidence, we notice that the
percentage of our sample that received barter payments rose from 3 percent (.2608 x .1325) in 1994 to
6 percent (.4042 x .1468) in 1996, resulting in a 71 percent increase in the incidence of barter
payments compared to the 11 percent increase noted above. However, increased prevalence of barter
(row 1) is not associated with higher barter payments (Goodsv, in row 2)33, so that barter payments
would do little to counteract an upward trend in the value outstanding debt to workers (Amtowed).34
These general patterns are seen in panel (B) to persist when we analyze them in a multivariate
context: the negative coefficients of the 1995 year dummy (duml995) indicate that the decline
between 1994 and 1995 in the probability of occurrence (-0.131 and -0.240 in regressions (1) and (2)
respectively), and in the value of barter (-0.351 in regression (3)) were significant, but the changes
between 1994 and 1996 were not significant (as seen from the insignificant coefficients for the 1996
year dummy, duml996).
While trends in barter between 1994 and 1996 are relevant for our analysis, our central focus
is to check if barter transactions responded to the presence of wage arrears. As seen in Panel (B),
regression (1), the positive coefficient of Pjowed (0.587) indicates that the likelihood of receiving
32The variable Goodsp is based on the survey question, "Have you received in the last 30 days at
this enterprise in lieu of payment for your labor something from its production or from the production of
another enterprise?" The response is coded as 1 if the respondent said "yes" and as 0 if the respondent
said "no".
33The variable Goodsv is based on the survey question, "Estimate, please, how much the product
you received cost in rubles, regardless of what you did with it?" Respondents skipped this question if they
answered that they did not receive goods in lieu of wages (i.e. Goodsp=0).
34The variable Amtowed is based on the survey question, "How much money in all have they not
paid you?" Respondents skipped this question if they answered that their employer did not owe them
wages (i.e., Pjowed=0). This variable (significantly) increased from approximately 770,000 rubles in 1994
to approximately 1,081,000 rubles in 1996 (both in December 1995 rubles). The value of outstanding
wage debt net of the value of goods received in lieu of wages (Amtowed-Goodsv), increased from 741,738
in 1994 to 1,055,165 in 1996, indicating that barter payments to workers had only a small mitigating effect
on the growth in outstanding debt to workers.
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barter was greater for respondents who were owed wages.35 Again, in specification (2), the
significantly positive coefficient (0.189) of \n(Amtowed) indicates that, among individuals who were
owed wages, the likelihood of receiving goods increased with the ruble value of outstanding arrears.36
In regression (3), the significantly positive coefficient (0.201) of \n(Amtowed) indicates that the value
of the goods received, conditional on receipt of goods, also increased with the ruble value of
outstanding arrears.37 These results provide evidence that barter transactions arose partly in response
to wage arrears. We also see from the coefficient of 0.201 that a 10 percent increase in the value of
outstanding wage debt was associated, on average, with only a 2 percent increase in the value of
payment in the form of goods. Therefore, while barter payments may have the potential to mitigate
the hardships to which employees were subjected by wage nonpayment, the magnitude and
prevalence of payment in goods and services in lieu of wages to the sampled Russian households had
only a small mitigating effect on the adverse impact of wage arrears.
IV. Conclusions
Enterprise-based wage arrears, approximately 80 percent of the total, present a formidable
problem defying an early resolution. In the short-run, a significant portion of government arrears
could be cleared via settlement of tax arrears by large natural monopolies such as Gazprom, revenues
from successive rounds of sale of government stocks in privatized companies and credits from
international agencies. An effective solution to the problem in the budget sector requires a reform of
the tax code, improved tax collection procedures, adoption of a realistic federal budget, and strict
supervision of the disbursement of funds allocated to local governments. As for the privatized
"Evaluated at the means of the regressors, the probit estimate suggests that the likelihood of
receiving barter payments was approximately 7.4 percent greater for respondents who faced wage
nonpayment.
36In regression (2), we restrict the analysis to respondents who were currently owed wages.
Therefore, the estimate of the variable \n(Amtowed) reflects the effect of the change in the value of
outstanding debt to a worker per se rather than a combination of this effect and the likelihood of having his
wage withheld, i.e. of observing a positive value for the variable Amtowed.
37If enterprise managers undertake barter transactions for enforcing wage flexibility in the presence
of downwardly rigid nominal wages, then barter may decline if market forces result in lower wages.
Markets require incentives for efficient functioning but traditions, administrative rules and political
considerations generally work against wage flexibility. In that case, barter practices may increase. If firms
resort to barter in response to liquidity constraints, then the prevalence and magnitude of barter may
increase unless the macroeconomic environment improves and the nonpayments crisis is resolved.
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enterprises, wage nonpayment would decline in the long run if enterprise restructuring aimed at
releasing excess labor moved forward, and bankruptcy laws leading to closure of unviable enterprises
were to be enforced.38 Short of such decisive measures, wage and pension nonpayment are likely to
persist, imposing widespread costs on the Russian population.
Our analysis based on an empirical investigation of household and individual data from 1994
to 1996 provides five main findings concerning the impact of wage and pension arrears on Russian
workers and the survival mechanism that they devised for containing the adverse effects of being
denied wages.. First, the prevalence of both wage and pension arrears rose over the period,
intensifying the incidence of poverty among workers and pensioners. Second, wage arrears produced
labor supply effects in that workers denied wages took second jobs and engaged in informal paid
activities. Third, workers experiencing wage arrears were more likely to receive transfers of money
and goods from relatives, and were less likely to give money (and goods) to their relatives.
Furthermore, the response of intra-family transfers to wage arrears reduced the positive impact of
wage nonpayment on the likelihood that a family would fall into poverty. Fourth, wage arrears were
positively associated with home production of food items, acted to reduce savings rates, and caused
families to sell their assets and to take out loans. As is the case with intra-family transfers, the sale of
family assets in response to wage nonpayment acted to partially mitigate the positive effect of wage
arrears on the incidence of poverty. Finally, while workers denied wages were more likely to be paid
in barter, the magnitude of barter payments had only a small mitigating effect on the upward trend in
wage arrears.
38In September 1998, Russia's new Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed clearing
outstanding wage debts to budget sector workers through increased monetary emissions and alcohol taxes
by reviving the state monopoly in the production and wholesale trade of vodka. While monetary expansion
will enable the government to pay state workers, it will result in inflation and slash the purchasing power
of cash payments without resolving the nonpayments crisis: wage debts will accumulate again in the
absence of restructuring and workforce downsizing. Alcohol taxes, estimated to generate revenues to clear
half the outstanding state sector debt, may create a continuing source of government revenue for paying
budget sector workers; during Soviet days, revenues from the state vodka monopoly yielded as much as 35
percent of state revenues that were reduced to a paltry 2-4 percent after Boris Yeltsin liquidated the state
monopoly in May 1992 (New York Times, September 26, 1998. "Russia Moves to Assert More Control
Over the Vodka Industry").
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Notes: 1. In Panel (A), each cell entry gives the percentage of respondents (ages 17 to 64) in
families with family incomes below regional poverty thresholds (see footnote 6). The first row
gives poverty percentages for respondents who reported that they were not owed wages by their
employers; the second row gives poverty percentages for people who reported that they were
owed wages by their employers. Superscripts a, b and c indicate significant differences (at 10
percent or better) in poverty rates between respondents based on whether or not they were
owed wages by their employers between 1994 and 1995 and between 1994 and 1996
respectively.
2. The dependent variable for regressions (1) and (2) in Panel (B) is Pov index, which is
defined as 1 if the family income (adjusted for family structure) fell below the poverty
threshold and as 0 if the family income did not fall below the poverty threshold. The
regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood probit. The sample size is 7,491. The
coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted by superscripts a, b, and c, respectively. Each
regression additionally includes a constant and control variables for age, tenure, gender,
education, region, occupation and industry (the full results are available on request). The
variables duml995 and duml996 are year dummies for 1995 and 1996, respectively.
* See footnote 8.
Table 2. The Incidence of Pension Arrears and the
Effect of Pension Arrears on the Incidence of Poverty
Panel (A): Pensions Arrears and Poverty
1994 1995 1996
Pension arrears 44.90* 71.93' 69.47a
No pension arrears 7.72 18.83 10.49

















Effect of Pension Arrears





















Notes: 1. Panel (A) reports the percentage of people who live in families with income below the poverty
level. Superscript a denotes a significant difference (at 10 percent or better) in poverty incidence based
on whether or not the individual is experiencing pension arrears.
2. In panel (B), maximum likelihood probit estimates are reported with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
The dependent variable for regression (1) is Pens30, a dummy=l if the respondent had not received
pension benefits in the past 30 days. The dependent variable for regressions (2) and (3) is a dummy=l
if the respondent lived in a family with income below the regional poverty threshold. Each regression
additionally includes a constant and variables for age, gender, education, and region of residence. We
exclude wage, occupation, and industry variables because our focus is on retired pensioners.










































Notes: 1. In panels (A) and (B), each cell reports the mean value
(multiplied by 100) for the relevant dummy variable separately for
respondents who were and who were not owed wages. We restrict the
analysis to respondents who reported positive wages. Superscript a
denotes significant differences (at 10 percent or better), for each year,
between respondents who were and who were not owed wages.
2. The regressions in panel (C) are estimated by maximum likelihood
probit. The coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard
errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels
are denoted by superscripts a and b respectively. Each regression
additionally contains the same vector of control variables listed in the
notes to Table 1 (the full results are available on request).
Table 4. The Incidence of
Wage Arrears and Intra-Family Transfers
Owed Wages
Gave money to relatives
Amount given to relatives
Received money from relatives
Amount received by relatives
Not Owed Wages
Gave money to relatives
Amount given to relatives
Received money from relatives





































































Notes: 1. In Panel (A) mean values are reported in each cell. The first and third rows in each
set contains the percentages of respondents who gave (or received) transfers to (or from)
relatives, the second and fourth rows give the average amounts given (or received) for the
group of respondents who gave (or received) funds from relatives. Superscript a in the 1996
column indicates a significant change (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1996;
superscript b indicates a significant difference between people who were owed wages and
those who were not owed wages.
2. Regressions (1) and (3) are estimated by maximum likelihood probit; regressions (2) and
(4) by ordinary least squares. Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent
respectively. The regressions additionally include a constant, and variables for wage rates,
age, gender, education, region of residence, occupation, and industry of employment, and are
restricted to people of age 16 through 65. Regression (2) is run only for people who gave
money to relatives. Similarly, regression (4) is run only for people who received money from
relatives.
Table 5a. The Incidence of Wage Arrears and Family
Survival Responses: Home Production, Consumption and Sales
Owed Wages
Consumed own food production
Sold own production
Value of sold own-production
Not Owed Wages
Consumed own food production
Sold own production



















































Notes'. 1. Mean (percentage) values are reported in each cell. The first and second rows in
each panel contain the percentage of the respondents who consumed (or sold) their own-
production; the third row in each panel gives the average ruble value of sold own-production
(conditional on some positive level of own-production sales). Superscript a in the 1996
column indicates a significant increase (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1996.
Superscript b in the top panel indicates a significant difference between people who are owed
wages and those who are not owed wages.
2. The first two regressions in Panel (B) are estimated by maximum likelihood probit; the
third is estimated by ordinary least squares and is only run for people who sold some portion
of their home produced goods. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance levels of 1, 5, and
10 percent respectively. All regressions additionally include a constant, and variables for
wage rates, age, gender, education, region of residence, occupation, and industry of
employment, and are restricted to people of age 16 through 65.
Table 5b. The Incidence of Wage Arrears and


























































Notes: 1. Mean (percentage) values are reported in each cell in Panel (A). The first row in
each group contains the percentage of the respondents who sold family assets; the second row
reports the percentage who took out a loan; the third row reports the average amount
borrowed conditional on having taken out a loan. Superscript a in the 1996 column indicates
a significant increase (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1996. Superscript b in the
top panel indicates a significant difference between people who are owed wages and those
who are not owed wages.
2. The first two regressions in Panel (B) are estimated by maximum likelihood probit; the
third is estimated by ordinary least squares and is only run for people who took out a loan.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. All
regressions additionally include a constant, and variables for wage rates, age, gender,
education, region of residence, occupation, and industry of employment, and are restricted to
people of age 16 through 65.
Table 5c. The Incidence of Wage Arrears and











































































Notes: 1. Mean (percentage) values are reported in each cell. The first and second rows in
each panel contain the percentage of the respondents who saved money or withdrew money
from savings; the second and fourth rowa contain the average ruble amounts saved or
withdrawn from savings. Superscript a in the 1996 column indicates a significant increase (at
10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1996. Superscript b in the top panel indicates a
significant difference between people who are owed wages and those who are not owed
wages.
2. The first and third regressions in Panel (B) are estimated by maximum likelihood probit;
the second and fourth are estimated by ordinary least squares and are only run for people who
saved money (column 2) or took money out of savings (column 4). Superscripts a, b, and c
denote significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. All regressions additionally
include a constant, and variables for wage rates, age, gender, education, region of residence,
occupation, and industry of employment, and are restricted to people of age 16 through 65.
Table 6. Wage Arrears and the Incidence of Poverty:






















































Notes: 1. Panel (A) reports mean values for the indicator variable Comp, which equals 1 if
a person is classified as living in a family which has income below the regional poverty
threshold when family transfers (Compl), or home production (Comp2) are not included,
but is not classified as poor when transfers or home production are included, and equals 0
when transfers or home production do not alter the person's poverty classification.
Superscript a indicates a significant difference (at 10 percent or better) in the
reclassiflcation of poverty status due to the inclusion of intra-family transfers or home
production for people based on whether or not they are experiencing wage arrears.
2. Panel (B) reports maximum likelihood probit parameter estimates (robust standard
errors are in parentheses) for five alternative regressions, each for a different dependent
variable: Povl defines poverty status (in terms of family income fallinng below regional
income thresholds) using actual family income; Pov2 uses actual family income
supplemented by the monetary value of intra-family transfers; and Pov3 uses actual family
income supplemented by the monetary value of home production. Superscripts a, b, and c
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. All regressions
additionally include a constant and variables for wage rates, age, gender, education, region
of residence, occupation, and industry of employment, and are restricted to people of age
16 through 65.
* significance at 11 percent.
Table 7. Barter and Net Outstanding Payments Arrears
Panel(A)
1994 1995 1996
Goodsp: the percentage of respondents
who are currently owed wages that have
received at least partial payment in goods
Goodsv: the average value of goods
received by respondents who have











































Notes: 1. In Panel (A), annual averages are reported with standard deviations in
parentheses. Superscripts a and b denote significant differences (at 10 percent or
better) between 1994 and 1995, and between 1995 and 1996 respectively. We restrict
the analysis to respondents who were owed wages by their employers (Pjowed=\).
Values reported for the variable Goodsp each year are the percentage of respondents
who received goods in lieu of wage payments. The cell entries for the variable
Goodsv is the average ruble value of goods received, in lieu of wage payments, for
those respondents who did receive goods, i.e. if Goodsp=\ and Goodsv>0.
2. Regressions (1) and (2) for Goodsp are estimated by maximum likelihood probit.
The \n(Goodsv) regression is estimated by ordinary least squares. The coefficient
estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1
percent and 5 percent levels are denoted by superscripts a and b respectively. The
sample for regression (2) is restricted to people who indicated that they were owed
wages by their employers {Pjowed=\)\ the \n(Goodsv) regression is additionally
limited to people who reported receiving goods in lieu of wage payments (Goodsp=\).
Each regression additionally contains the vector of control variables listed in the notes
to Table 1 (the full results are available on request).
3. Respondents in the military were deleted because none of the people serving in the
military reported receiving goods in lieu of wages (Goodsp=0).
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